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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
lease of property not redeemed'within two years. The effect of
the statute of limitation was thus to extinguish the lien represented
by the certificate of sale. The court in its opinion discussed the
contention of counsel that the statute "destroys the security upon
which the purchaser relied when he advanced his money, namely,
the lien of the record after sale",8 and held that the legislation did
not impair the obligation of the plaintiff's contract.
No basis for distinguishing the West Virginia case from
Wheeler v. Jackson is apparent. In each case a lien existed the
enforcement of which was not subject to any statutory limitation
prior to the enactment of the statute whose constitutionality was
questioned. In each case the questioned legislation had the effect of
extinguishing the lien after the expiration of a certain period of
time. In each case the holder of the lien had reasonable opportunity
to enforce the lien after the effective date of the statute of limitation. In neither case was it necessary to resort to court action to
enforce the lien; in the one, only a sale by the trustee under the
trust deed was required; in the other, a conveyance executed by
the tax collector would suffice. Indeed, all the facts which are
material to the problem of constitutionality seem to be virtually
identical in the two cases.
Accordingly, the West Virginia decision might well have been
for the plaintiff instead of for the defendant, if the case of Wheeler
v. Jackson had come to the court's attention.

FUTURE INTERESTS -

sa mare REGARDED

AS IN

POSTHUMOUS CHILD -

BEING.

-

CHILD

en ventre

A testatrix by will placed cer-

tain property in trust for her children for a period of twenty-one
years after her death, but if any child should die within the period
"leaving any issue him or her surviving", then in trust for such
child absolutely, provided that if the child should die without issue
his share should go to the other children. A child died within the
period leaving his widow enciente with a child later born alive.
Held, that he died without "leaving any issue him surviving" on
the ground that a child en ventre sa mare would only be considered
as surviving when it was to receive a direct benefit under the will.
Elliot v. Joicey.'
8 Id. at 256.
2 (1935) A. C. 209.
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This case squarely presents the question of how far the courts
will go in holding a child en ventre sa mire as in being for the purpose of determining property interests. It has been held both in
America and England that a child en ventre sa mire comes within
the meanings of the words "living", "born", and "surviving"
where it is for the child's direct benefit.2 But this construction of
the instrument has been discarded when it would be disadvantageous to the child.3 An analogous group of cases are those in which
there is a gift to a class wherein it is held that the closing of the
class is postponed to include the child en ventre sa mare if it be to
his benefit to do so.4 The probable basis for these decisions is that
this fictional construction most nearly coincides with the wishes of
the testator had he foreseen such a situation arising.5
However for the purpose of the application of the rule against
perpetuities, the child en ventre sa mire is regarded as in being
whether it is to his advantage or detriment.6 This exception, it
would seem, by prolonging the testator's plan helps to further the
actual intention of the testator as do the foregoing cases.
In the principal case the court refused to consider the child
en ventre sa mnh.re as "surviving" when it would have indirectly
benefitted the child by the enrichment of the father's estate. This
is the first case in England to draw this distinction between an indirect and direct benefit,7 illustrating the reluctance of the English
courts to carry this fictional construction of a will further than the
case of the direct benefit. The American courts have been more
liberal, holding such an indirect benefit as sufficient reason to treat
2 Randolph v. Randolph, 40 N. J. Eq. 73 (1885); In re Gebhardt's Will,
139 Misc. 775, 249 N. Y. S. 286 (1936) ; In re Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 82
Misc. 330, 143 N. Y. S. 700 (1913); Hewitt v. Green, 77 N. J. Eq. 345, 77
Atl. 25 (1910); Dexter v. Attorney General, 224 Mass. 215, 112 N. E. 946
(1916); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 26 Am. Dec. 598 (1834); Barker v.
Pearce, 30 Pa. 173, 72 Am. Dee. 691 (1858) ; In re Salaman, 2 Ch. 46 (1907);
Doe d. Clarke v. Clarke, 2 H. Bl. 399 (1795).
a M'Knight v. Read, 1 Whart. 213 (Pa. 1836) ; Armistead v. Dangerfield, 3
Munf. 20 (Va. 1812); Villar v. Gilbey, (1907) A. C. 139.
4 Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Con. 240, 13 Atl. 414 (1888); Lamar v. Crosby, 162
Ky. 320, 172 S. W. 693 (1915); Scott v. Turner, 137 Miss. 636, 102 So. 467
(1925); In re McEwan's Will, 234 N. Y. 557, 138 N. B. 445 (1922); Swift
v. Duffield, 5 S. & R. 38 (Pa. 1818); Smart v. King, 19 Tenn. 149, 33 Am.
Dec. 137 (1838).
5 Comment (1935) 33 Micn. L. REv. 414.
6 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915)

§ 220; In re Wilmer's

Trusts, 1 Ch. 874 (1903).
7 Note (1935) 13 CAN. B. REv. 594.
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the child en ventre as in being,8 and in fact, mere absence of disadvantage being enough in one case.'
It seems that this posthumous child was within "the reason
and motive of the gift ' which was clearly intended to provide for
grandchildren, therefore it is submitted that the distinction drawn
by the court is unreasonable on the facts of the case, and inconsistent with the probable intention of the testator to provide directly
or indirectly for her grandchildren.

INSURANCE-

CONSTRUCTION

OF

EXCEPTIONS -

STORAGE

IN

In a recent West
Virginia case a recovery was sought under an automobile theft insurance policy which excluded a recovery if the car was voluntarily
placed by the owner in the possession of another. Held, that a delivery of the automobile to a public garage for the purpose of storage is not such a delivery of possession as will preclude a recovery
when the car is stolen by an employee of the garage. Gibson v.St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Campany.'
This decision, placing West Virginia in accord with the majority of cases in other jurisdictions, expressly overrules the earlier
West Virginia case of Shelton v. Insurance Company.2 In the latter
case a delivery of a car to another to be washed and returned was
held such a voluntary relinquishment of possession as would preclude a recovery. The principal case distinguishes the Shelton, case
however, on the ground that statements made therein concerning
delivery of possession was dictum and unnecessary to the verdict.
The principal case, in accordance with the weight of authority,
differentiates between delivery of possession and delivery of custody.3 Most courts hold that delivery of possession within the

PUBLIC

GARAGE HELD

VITHIN

THEFT COVERAGE. -

8 Groce v. Rittenberry, 14 Ga. 232 (1853); Bedon v. Bedon, 2 Bailey 231
(S. C. 1831).
9 Kimbro v. Harper, 113 Okla. 46, 238 Pac. 840 (1925).
lo S~e Trower v. Butts, 1 Sim. & Stu. 181, 185 (Ch. 1823).

1184 S. E. 562 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Shelton v. National Fire Ins. Co., 115 W. Va. 268, 174 S. E. 887 (1934).
3 Emerson v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 89, 25 S. W. 289 (1894); Tripp v. United
States Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 141 Kans. 897, 44 P. (2d) 236 (1935); Allen
v. Berkshire Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 471, 168 AtI. 682 (1933); Miller
v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 12 La. App. 315, 125 So. 150 (1929); Security Ins.
Co. v. Sellers-Sammons-Signor Motor Co., 235 S. W. 617 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921).
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